Despite political uncertainty and a fragmented parliament, Sweden has built a broad consensus on immigration, security and welfare reform, while Britain continues to struggle with policy delays and internal party divisions.
Sweden’s latest election has left the country facing a difficult political arithmetic. The left-wing bloc secured 176 seats against 173 for the governing right-wing bloc, but the winning group has yet to establish a stable working majority. Negotiations could drag on, potentially producing a fragile government.
Yet beneath the parliamentary uncertainty, Sweden has reached a level of cross-party agreement on major policy issues that contrasts sharply with the political divisions in Britain. Immigration, law and order, defence and even market-oriented reforms to the welfare state have become areas of broad consensus.
The shift is particularly striking on immigration. Once regarded as one of Europe’s most welcoming countries, Sweden has adopted increasingly restrictive policies, with the number of people arriving falling sharply over the past decade. Between 2015 and 2025, the country’s intake declined by 95%, while its per-capita asylum applications last year stood at less than half the European average.
The Social Democrats, the largest centre-left party, criticised the government during the election campaign over individual cases, including the deportation of teenagers who had grown up in Sweden. However, the party has accepted several measures that would once have been politically unthinkable on the left.
These include tighter citizenship requirements based on length of residence, language proficiency, civic knowledge, employment and good conduct. Proposals to deport non-citizens convicted of crimes or failing to pay debts, alongside financial incentives for immigrants to return to their countries of origin, have also gained mainstream support.
A tougher approach to security and defence
A similar consensus has emerged around law and order. In response to gang violence in suburbs with large migrant populations, Sweden has increased spending on law enforcement, expanded proactive policing and lowered barriers to prosecuting young people involved in serious crimes, including shootings.
Measures that once provoked controversy are increasingly viewed across the political spectrum as necessary responses to organised crime.
Defence policy has undergone a comparable transformation. Sweden joined NATO in 2024, increased military spending by 18% in 2024-25 and distributed a public information booklet titled In Case of Crisis or War, setting out guidance for citizens in an emergency.
The shift has attracted little opposition from major left-wing parties. More than six in 10 Swedes support NATO membership, compared with roughly three in 10 before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Military service has also gained prestige among younger Swedes, increasingly seen as a route into influential circles.
The far-right Sweden Democrats, meanwhile, saw their vote share fall for the first time following a scandal involving allegations of Russian infiltration.
Market reforms within the welfare state
Sweden’s political consensus extends beyond immigration and security to the organisation of public services.
The Social Democrats have criticised private equity firms for profiting from publicly funded services, but the main parties broadly accept a system that combines extensive welfare provision with private-sector participation. Parents can use publicly funded vouchers to send children to independent schools, while private companies deliver a substantial share of primary and specialist healthcare, including hospital and ambulance services.
Patients also pay modest fees for medical appointments, a system intended in part to encourage more cost-conscious use of healthcare.
These arrangements would sit uneasily with parts of Britain’s Conservative Party, yet they have become established features of Sweden’s political settlement.
The system survives political uncertainty because it offers something to each major political constituency. The left retains high public spending, market-oriented politicians maintain competition within public services, and the right secures tougher immigration and law-and-order policies.
Neither the Social Democrats nor the centre-right Moderates are seeking to dismantle the foundations of this compromise. The former have largely abandoned ambitions to reverse decades of economic liberalisation, while the latter do not advocate scrapping the welfare state.
Sweden also has greater financial room to manoeuvre than Britain. Public debt stands at 35.1% of gross domestic product, compared with 93.8% in the UK, according to the figures cited in the analysis. Its pension system is another relative strength, with the retirement age linked to life expectancy and all employees enrolled in workplace pension schemes.
Britain’s struggle to turn power into policy
The contrast with Britain has become increasingly pronounced after two years of Labour government, which the analysis portrays as a period of missed opportunities and policy reversals.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer suffered a major setback in the summer of 2025 when he abandoned relatively modest welfare reforms following a rebellion among Labour MPs. His defence secretary subsequently resigned, citing inadequate funding for the department.
Immigration policy has proved similarly difficult to reform. Successive British governments have struggled to introduce measures comparable to Sweden’s restrictions, while proposals associated with Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood have faced resistance from Labour backbenchers.
The article also criticises Prime Minister Andy Burnham, portraying him as a more effective politician than his predecessor but one who has yet to offer a convincing programme for tackling Britain’s underlying problems.
Burnham’s approach is characterised as a combination of ambitious promises, delayed decisions and efforts to redirect political debate towards structural reforms. Proposals such as introducing proportional representation, for example, risk overshadowing more contentious questions within Labour, including asylum, immigration, sickness benefits, defence and economic growth.
The criticism is that the government continues to postpone difficult decisions rather than building agreement around policies that could address the country’s most pressing challenges.
Political uncertainty does not necessarily mean paralysis
Sweden’s own political problems should not be underestimated. The country took 134 days to form a government following its 2018 election, and police investigations into possible electoral fraud could yet affect the latest parliamentary calculations.
Nevertheless, the central argument is that political instability does not automatically prevent effective policymaking. Sweden’s parties have developed a shared understanding of the direction in which the country should move, allowing institutions to continue functioning even when forming a government becomes difficult.
Britain, by contrast, has a parliamentary majority government but continues to face internal rebellions and disagreements over fundamental policy choices.
The difference, ultimately, is not simply the strength of individual leaders or the size of their parliamentary majorities. It is the extent to which political parties are willing to accept compromises, establish common ground and act on difficult decisions.
On that measure, Sweden appears better positioned than Britain to turn political authority into practical results.
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