The Russia-U.S. mission by CIA Director John Ratcliffe is part of a tradition dating back to the Cold War that survived the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similar missions were carried out by William Burns in 2021 and John Brennan in 2016.
When political relations between Washington and Moscow become too difficult for conventional diplomacy, intelligence channels often come into play. CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s mission to Russia fits into a tradition that dates back to the Cold War and continued after the Soviet Union collapsed. The involvement of intelligence chiefs does not necessarily mean that a major agreement is being prepared.
At times, it can indicate the opposite: relations have deteriorated so badly that a discreet channel is needed to prevent incidents, deliver warnings, discuss terrorism or nuclear weapons, or negotiate prisoner exchanges. Shortly before Ratcliffe’s trip, U.S. intelligence disclosed plans by Vladimir Putin for new mass mobilizations and for threatening the Suwalki Corridor, which connects Russia with its Kaliningrad exclave between Poland and Lithuania. Both developments are a concern for NATO.
Among the messages the CIA chief may be carrying is the classic warning: “We know what you are preparing, and we want to warn you about the consequences.”
Recent meetings
An instructive precedent came in November 2021, when President Joe Biden sent CIA Director William Burns to Moscow. A former U.S. ambassador to Russia who speaks Russian and has extensive knowledge of the Kremlin, Burns met with Nikolai Patrushev, then secretary of Russia’s Security Council, and Sergei Naryshkin, head of the SVR foreign intelligence service.
Only later did the purpose of the mission become clear. Biden had tasked Burns with conveying what U.S. intelligence knew about Russia’s preparations to invade Ukraine and warning Putin about the consequences. Three months later, the war began.
In November 2022, Burns met Naryshkin again, this time in Ankara. The White House stressed that the meeting was not about negotiating peace. The main message concerned the potentially catastrophic consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. The detention of Americans in Russia was also discussed.
The episode illustrates how intelligence channels can become more important when political negotiations are deadlocked. The approach was not invented by Biden. In 2016, John Brennan, CIA director under Barack Obama, also made a confidential trip to Moscow amid the Syrian crisis and two years after Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
An attempted thaw
Today’s context is made more intriguing by President Donald Trump’s attempt to improve relations with Moscow. In February 2025, a lengthy phone call with Putin marked the resumption of direct presidential dialogue. Trump said he believed the Russian leader wanted peace, even suggesting that Russia could return to the G7. He also distanced himself from some of Kyiv’s objectives, including recovering all lost territory and joining NATO.
The effort reached its high point at the Trump-Putin summit in Anchorage on August 15, 2025. For Putin, the meeting was a major image boost: after years of sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine, he was once again received by a U.S. president on American soil.
Trump was relying on personal diplomacy to achieve something Biden had not attempted: a direct understanding with the Russian leader that could pave the way toward ending the war.
The spirit of Anchorage
Anchorage, however, produced neither a ceasefire nor an agreement. Since then, the so-called “spirit of Anchorage” has faded.
Moscow continued to demand control over the entire Donbas, including territories its forces had not captured, along with restrictions on Ukraine’s strategic and military sovereignty. Washington rejected those conditions.
The gap became even more apparent in 2026. In June, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused Washington of violating the supposed “Alaska agreements.”
Rubio responded that no agreement had been reached in Anchorage, only proposals had been exchanged. Putin eventually acknowledged publicly that nothing had been signed or concluded. Moscow’s repeated references to the “spirit of Anchorage” increasingly appeared to be an attempt to place responsibility for the failed thaw on the United States.
Economic pressure
Even as Washington continues talking to Moscow, U.S. economic pressure is expanding. On the eve of Ratcliffe’s trip to Moscow, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent launched “Operation Economic Outcast”, a broad sanctions campaign targeting Iran and those supporting its trade networks.
Russia, as a strategic partner of Tehran, is also drawn into this new area of confrontation, although the U.S. campaign is primarily aimed at Iranian economic networks and their international facilitators.
The overall picture of the Trump-Putin thaw is therefore paradoxical. Communication channels are more numerous than they were during the final phase of the Biden administration, but the substance of the Russian-American conflict has changed much less.
Trump has restored Putin’s access to a direct interlocutor in the White House, but so far he has failed to turn that relationship into a compromise over Ukraine.
It is precisely during periods of dialogue without agreement that spy diplomacy becomes more useful. Even if prisoner releases take place, that does not mean the intelligence channel is limited to such matters; many other issues can be discussed behind closed doors.
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